

The registration assistance will be also available on Sunday (July 6) from 17:00 to 19:00

Monday 7th	Tuesday 8th	Wednesday 9th
8:00-8:45 Registration		
8:45-9:00 Opening Session	8:30-10:00 Parallel Sessions	8:30-10:00 Parallel Sessions
9:00-10:00 Plenary Session 1	10:00-10:30 Coffee Break	10:00-10:30 Coffee Break
10:00-11:00 Plenary Session 2	10:30-11:30 Plenary Session 3	10:30-11:30 Plenary Session 4
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break	11:30-12:00 Coffee Break	11:30-12:00 Coffee Break
11:30-13:00 Parallel Sessions	12:00-13:10 Parallel Sessions	12:00-13:10 Parallel Sessions
13:00-14:10 Lunch	13:10-14:30 Lunch	13:10-14:30 Lunch
14:10-15:20 Parallel Sessions	14:30-16:00 Parallel Sessions	14:30-15:40 Parallel Sessions
15:20-15:35 Coffee Break		15:40-16:00 Break
15:35-16:45 Parallel Sessions		16:00-16:15 Closing Session
16:45-17:30 SING Representatives Council		16:15-17:15 SING Assembly
18:30-19:30 Old Town Tour	17:00-22:00 "Wieliczka Salt Mine" Tour and Dinner	19:00 Gala Dinner at the "Palace under the Rams" (Piwnica pod Baranami)
19:30-22:00 Welcome Reception at "Collegium Maius"		

Monday 7th

8:00-8:45	Registration				
8:45-9:00	Opening session (Aula DO)				
9:00-10:00	Plenary session 1 (Aula DO), ANDRZEJ NOWAK: Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Growth Economies , Chairman: Jacek Mercik				
10:00-11:00	Plenary session 2 (Aula DO), GIANFRANCO GAMBARELLI: Some Open Problems in Cooperative Games , Chairman: Jacek Mercik				
11:00-11:30	Coffee Break (Hall)				
Parallel sessions	Dynamic Networks and Cooperative Games I	Monopoly and Oligopoly games	Nash equilibrium	Games with externalities	Signaling and Cheap Talk
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
11:30-13:00	<u>László Kóczy</u> : A risk-based core	<u>Mingli Zheng</u> and <u>Chong Wang</u> : Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity	<u>Anna Zseleva</u> , <u>Dries Vermeulen</u> and <u>János Flesch</u> : Modeling games with finitely additive probabilities	<u>Oskar Skibski</u> , <u>Tomasz Michalak</u> and <u>Michael Wooldridge</u> : Reconsidering the Shapley value in games with externalities	<u>Lars Metzger</u> : Contests with forced coalitions and incomplete information
	<u>Philippe Solal</u> , <u>Sylvain Béal</u> and <u>Eric Rémila</u> : A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance	<u>Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiewicz</u> , <u>Marek Bodnar</u> and <u>Fryderyk Mirola</u> : Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices – off-steady-state analysis	<u>Mark Van Lokeren</u> : Nash equilibria in a Downsian competition with costs	<u>Joss Erick Sánchez-Pérez</u> : A class of solutions for games with externalities generalizing the Shapley value	<u>Andrzej Paliński</u> : A game-theoretic approach to bank loan repayment
	<u>Alexandre Skoda</u> : Convexity of restricted games induced by arbitrary partitions	<u>Matteo Foschi</u> : Asymmetric information, commitment and self-control	<u>Bartłomiej Kubica</u> and <u>Adam Woźniak</u> : Interval methods for computing strong Nash equilibria of continuous games	<u>Sylvain Ferrières</u> and <u>Frank Huettnner</u> : Linear anonymous solutions for cooperative games with externalities	<u>Jonas Hedlund</u> : Persuasion with communication costs
	<u>Gilles Grandjean</u> , <u>Wouter Vergote</u> and <u>Daniela Tellone</u> : Cooperation, competition and market entry	<u>Andrea Di Liddo</u> : Competition in a luxury market in the presence of counterfeiters	<u>Dieter Balkenborg</u> and <u>Dries Vermeulen</u> : Parametrization of the Nash correspondence	<u>Helga Habis</u> and <u>Jens Gudmundsson</u> : Assignment games with externalities	<u>Margaret Meyer</u> , <u>Inés Moreno de Barreda</u> and <u>Julia Nafziger</u> : Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
13:00-14:10	Lunch (Hall)				

Monday 7th continued

Parallel sessions	Dynamic Networks and Cooperative Games II	Duopoly, Hotelling	Equilibria I	Learning and Experimentation	Assignment games I
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
14:10-15:20	<u>Julia Belau</u> : Consequences of connection failure - centrality and the importance for cohesion	<u>Michał Ramsza</u> : The Bertrand duopoly with bounded-rational consumers and explicitly modeled demand	Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dzięwulski, Kevin Reffett and <u>Łukasz Woźny</u> : Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities	Johannes Hörner, <u>Nicolas Klein</u> and Sven Rady: Strongly symmetric equilibria in bandit games	<u>Francisco Robles Jiménez</u> and Marina Núñez: One-seller assignment markets with multiple demands: a strategic implementation of the buyers-optimal core allocation
	<u>Noemí Navarro</u> : Forward-looking pairwise stability in networks with externalities across components	<u>Michael Kramm</u> and Maximilian Conze: The recommendation effect in the Hotelling game - a new result for an old model	Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn and <u>Marco Slikker</u> : Price of anarchy in sequencing situations and the impossibility to coordinate	<u>Gulseren Mutlu</u> : Learning under incentives	<u>Péter Wojuteczky</u> : Stable fixtures problem with payments
	<u>Jan-Peter Siedlarek</u> and Anja Prummer: Opinion leaders in influence networks and the integration of immigrant communities	<u>Rainer Berkemer</u> : Sampling dynamics applied to Hotelling location games with three or more players	<u>Yigal Gerchak</u> and Marc Kilgour: Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design		<u>Christian Trudeau</u> : Assignment, communication graph, stability and non-manipulability
15:20-15:35 Coffee Break (Hall)					

Monday 7th continued

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Values I	Public good	Equilibria II	Experiments/Experimental Game theory	Assignment games II
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
15:35-16:45	<u>André Casajus</u> and <u>Frank Huettnner</u> : Weak monotonicity, proportional taxation, and the egalitarian Shapley values	<u>Toshiyuki Hirai</u> : Stable sets of a strategic public good provision game	<u>Takahiro Watanabe</u> : Existence of Pure Strategy equilibrium in finite games and direction preservingness of best reply functions	<u>Jesper Breinbjerg</u> , <u>Lars Peter Østerdal</u> and <u>Alexander Sebald</u> : Strategic behavior and social outcomes in bottlenecks: Experimental evidence	<u>Ata Atay</u> and <u>Marina Núñez</u> : Three-sided assignment games: core stability and undominated allocations
	<u>Julio Macias-Ponce</u> and <u>William Olvera-Lopez</u> : A characterization of a solution based on prices for a discrete cost sharing problem	<u>Alfonso Rosa-Garcia</u> and <u>Alejandro Rosa-Galvez</u> : Private provision of a public good: cooperation and altruism of internet forum users	<u>Stewart Ethier</u> and <u>Jiyeon Lee</u> : A game-theoretic analysis of baccara banque	<u>Dominique Chariot</u> : Trust and sequential reciprocity	<u>Dezső Bednay</u> : vNM stable sets in Böhm-Bawerk horse markets
	<u>Leon Petrosyan</u> : Cooperative games with perfect information	<u>Sławomir Plaskacz</u> and <u>Joanna Zwierzchowska</u> : A Smale type strategies for the 3-player “public goods” game		<u>Katja Nottbohm</u> and <u>Ivica Rogina</u> : Trustworthiness of people in negotiations and their visual impressions	<u>Javier Martínez-De-Albéniz</u> , <u>Carlos Rafels</u> and <u>Neus Ybern</u> : The nucleolus of the assignment game: a simple procedure and a rule
16:45-17:30	SING Representatives Council (Room LA)				
18:30-19:30	Old Town Tour				
19:30-22:00	Welcome Reception at “Collegium Maius”				

Tuesday 8th

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Solutions	Models of interaction in Game Theory I	Solutions for games with coalitional structure	Voting I	Auctions
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
8:30-10:00	<u>Ilya Katsev</u> : The nucleolus for additive games with hierarchy	M. Josunse Albizuri and <u>Peter Sudhölter</u> : Axiomatizations of the core of games with communication structures	<u>Maria Albina Puente</u> and José Miguel Giménez: Modified multilinear extensions for generalized mixed semivalues	Edith Elkind, <u>Piotr Faliszewski</u> , Piotr Skowron and Arkadii Slinko: Properties of multiwinner voting rules	<u>Gyula Seres</u> : Sequential bargaining with delay
	<u>Natalia Naumova</u> : Generalized nucleolus, kernels, and bargaining sets for cooperative games with restricted cooperation	Sylvain Beal, <u>Anna Khmelnitskaya</u> and Philippe Solal: Two-step values for games with two-level communication structures	<u>Maria Ekes</u> : Some remarks on generalized Owen index in simple games with externalities	<u>Julio González-Díaz</u> , Florian Herold and Diego Domínguez: Endogenous sequential voting	<u>Ella Segev</u> and Aner Sela: Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions
	<u>Ana Meca</u> and Greys Susic: On supremum BBCM games	<u>Frank Steffen</u> : Positional power in the institutional setting of the European Union	<u>Inés Gallego Sánchez</u> , Julio Fernández García, Andrés Jiménez Losada and Manuel Ordóñez Sánchez: Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation	<u>Hannu Nurmi</u> : Are we done with preference rankings?	<u>Arieh Gavious</u> and Yizhaq Minchuk: Revenue in contests with many participants
	Tibor Németh and <u>Miklós Pintér</u> : The WS core of a TUU game as the core of an NTU game	<u>Encarnación Algaba</u> , René van Den Brink and Chris Dietz: Characterization of the hierarchical power on network structures	Gleb Koshevoy, Takamasa Suzuki and <u>Dolf Talman</u> : Solutions for games with general coalitional structure		<u>Yuan Ju</u> , Youngsub Chun and Rene van den Brink: Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts
10:00-10:30	Coffee Break (Hall)				
10:30-11:30	Plenary session 3 (Aula DO), ARIEL RUBINSTEIN: Response Time and Decision Making: A "Free" Experimental Study , Chairman: Agnieszka Rusinowska				
11:30-12:00	Coffee Break (Hall)				

Tuesday 8th continued

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Values II	Models of interaction in Game Theory II	Social networks	Voting and Power Indices I	Bargaining I
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
12:00-13:10	<u>Enrique González-Arangüena</u> , Conrado Manuel and Mónica Del Pozo: Values of games with weighted graphs	Ulrich Faigle and <u>Michel Grabisch</u> : Linear transforms, bases and least square approximation for cooperation systems	<u>Hubert János Kiss</u> and Alfonso Rosa-García: On the mobilizing role of social media in revolutions: A game-theoretic approach	<u>José Manuel Gallardo Morilla</u> , Nieves Jiménez Jiménez and Andrés Jiménez Losada: Power indices for authorization structures	<u>Nadia Mâagli</u> and Marco Licalzi: Bargaining over a common conceptual space
	<u>Francisco Sanchez Sanchez</u> and Luis Hernández-Lamonedá: Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants	<u>Agnieszka Rusinowska</u> , Jean-François Caulier and Michel Grabisch: An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes	<u>Mitri Kitti</u> : Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors	<u>Stefano Moretti</u> : Coalitional games for abstract argumentation	<u>Ahmet Özkardaş</u> and Agnieszka Rusinowska: On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
	<u>Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano</u> and Francisco López-Navarrete: How to allocate revenues in an Internet TV system? A game theoretical answer	<u>Irinel Dragan</u> : On the coalitional rationality of the Shapley value and other efficient values		Federica Briata, <u>Marco Dall'Aglio</u> and Vito Fragnelli: Power indices measuring collusion in the Knaster's procedure	Daniel Cardona and <u>Antoni Rubí-Barceló</u> : Investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities
13:10-14:30 Lunch (Hall)					

Tuesday 8th continued

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games	Evolutionary games and prisoner's dilemma	Bankruptcy game	Voting II	Bargaining II
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA	Room SOL
14:30-16:00	<u>Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez</u> , Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo and Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo: On the others monotonicity properties of airport games	<u>Guilhem Lecouteux</u> : The evolutionary stability of payoff-maximising behaviour	<u>Jiawen Li</u> and Yuan Ju: A non-cooperative approach to the Talmud solution for the bankruptcy problems	<u>Honorata Sosnowska</u> : Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation	<u>Daniel Cardona</u> and Antoni Rubí-Barceló: On the Efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
	<u>Trine Tornøe Platz</u> : On games arising from multi-depot traveling salesman problems	<u>Adam Pigoń</u> : Evolutionary macroeconomics	Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez, <u>Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo</u> and Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo: On the core-center of bankruptcy games	<u>Josep Freixas</u> and Montserrat Pons: What is essential in measuring power and what is not?	<u>Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska</u> : The Common agricultural policy reforms under the WTO pressure-game theoretical approach
	<u>Gabriel Turbay</u> : Moves of the third kind: The strategic nature of cooperative games	<u>Robert Golański</u> : Prevalence of cooperative strategies in evolutionary repeated prisoner's dilemma	<u>M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro</u> , José María Alonso-Meijide and Mikel Álvarez-Mozos: Efficient Banzhaf values based on bankruptcy rules	<u>Imma Curiel</u> : A multifaceted analysis of the electoral system of the Republic of Suriname	<u>Rod Garratt</u> and Marek Pycia: Efficient bilateral trade
		<u>Andrzej Wieczorek</u> : Extension of the definition of prisoners' dilemma to games with arbitrarily many players and strategies	<u>Natividad Llorca</u> , Elisabeth Gutiérrez, Manuel A. Mosquera and Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano: Bankruptcy techniques for solving linear production situations with a common-pool resource	<u>Jacek Mercik</u> : When minority beats majority: the case of Augustus II the Strong – the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth	
17:00-22:00 "Wieliczka Salt Mine" Tour and Dinner					

Wednesday 9th

Parallel sessions	Allocation	Extensive and Strategic games	Market models	Mechanism design
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA
8:30-10:00	Marco Dall'Aglio, <u>Camilla Di Luca</u> and Lucia Milone: Maxmin allocation of homogeneous goods: the three players case	Mamoru Kaneko and <u>Shuige Liu</u> : Eliminations of dominated strategies and inessential players: an abstraction process	<u>Joanna Syrda</u> : Music industry concentration and product variety	<u>Ville Korpela</u> : The revelation principle in retrospect: Some observations on the multiple equilibrium problem
	<u>Pere Timoner</u> and Josep Maria Izquierdo: Rationing problems with payoff-thresholds	<u>Ludmila Novac</u> : Approach of the loss risk for the problem of currency exchange	<u>Zbigniew Świtalski</u> : A characterization of the set of equilibrium price vectors in the Gale-Shapley market model	<u>Volker Britz</u> and Hans Gersbach: Democratic mechanisms with experimentation
	<u>Frank Huettner</u> and Dominik Karos: An allocation rule for liability situations with multiple tortfeasors	<u>Dmitriy Kvasov</u> and John Hillas: Backward induction in games without perfect recall	<u>Chih Chang</u> : Unawareness and the standard state-space models	<u>Lars Ehlers</u> , Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach
	<u>Yusuke Kamishiro</u> : On the core of a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information	<u>Igal Milchtaich</u> : Polyequilibrium	<u>Fernando Bernstein</u> and Víctor Martínez de Albéniz: Using product rotation to induce purchases from strategic consumers	

10:00-10:30	Coffee Break (Hall)			
10:30-11:30	Plenary session 4 (Aula DO), GERARD VAN DER LAAN, Cooperative Decision Making in Water Allocation Problems , Chairman: Vito Fragnelli			
11:30-12:00	Coffee Break (Hall)			

Wednesday 9th continued

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: Shapley value	Allocation and Networks	TU games I	Voting and Power Indices II
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA
12:00-13:10	<u>Koji Yokote</u> : Consistent weighted Shapley values and the core in NTU games	Gustavo Bergantiños, Julio González-Díaz, <u>Ángel Manuel González-Rueda</u> and María Pérez-Fernández de Córdoba: Allocating gas losses in gas transport networks	<u>Stéphane Gonzalez</u> and Michel Grabisch: Autonomous coalitions	<u>Magdalena Adamus</u> : Hugo Steinhaus' early contributions to the game theory
	<u>Ramón Flores</u> , Elisenda Molina and Juan Tejada: The Shapley group value	<u>Eliane Lambertz</u> : Cost allocation in generalized Steiner tree games	<u>Eric Bahel</u> : On the core and bargaining set of a veto game	Cesarino Bertini, <u>Izabella Stach</u> : On Public values and power indices
	<u>Yukihiko Funaki</u> and Koji Yokote: Several bases of a game space and an application to the Shapley value	<u>Péter Csóka</u> : Risk capital allocation in networks	Jesús Getán, <u>Jesús Montes</u> and Carles Rafels: PMAS and Lorenz-PMAS in coalitional games	<u>Marcin Malawski</u> : Voting games with some "large" and many "small" players: limit behaviour of some power indices
13:10-14:30 Lunch (Hall)				
Parallel sessions	Cooperative games and Networks	Decision making and Simulations	TU games II	
	Aula DO	Aula RE	Room MI	Room FA
14:30-15:40	Radim Valenčík and <u>Ondrej Cernik</u> : Analysis of social networks with usage of modified Raiffa solution for cooperative games	<u>Alexandru W. Popp</u> : Optimizing game theoretical simulations	Francesc Llerena and <u>Llúcia Mauri</u> : On reduced games and the lexmax solution	
	<u>Dávid Csercsik</u> : Cooperation in traffic routing games on scale free wireless networks	<u>Dieter Balkenborg</u> : Rationalizability and logical inference	<u>Yasushi Agatsuma</u> , Yukihiko Funaki and Koji Yokote: Random reduction consistency of Weber set and the core	
	<u>Martha Saboya</u> , Guillermo Owen and Susana López: Reliability of communication networks	<u>Vito Fragnelli</u> , Montserrat Pons, Josep Freixas and Lluís Sanmiquel: Some measures to evaluate the importance of factors contributing in a process	<u>Elena Yanovskaya</u> : Self-covariant solutions to cooperative games with transferable utilities	
15:40-16:00 Break				
16:00-16:15 Closing Session (Aula DO)				
16:15-17:15 SING Assembly (Aula DO)				
19:00 Gala Dinner at "Palace under the Rams" (Pałac pod Baranami)				